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A renewed interest in the theory of optimal taxation hasemerged in
recent years. The theory of optimal taxation generally has followedtwo
disparate paths: the theory of optimal commodity (or indirect) taxation
and the theory of optimal income (or direct) taxation.Only occasionally
have attempts been made to integrate orcompare these two approaches. While
each has an interesting history In economics, much important workis of
recent origin and, I shall argue below, much remains to be done ifwe are
to use optimal tax theory as a guide to the formulation of taxpolicy.
The major achievement of the theories of optimal income andcommodity
taxation is the derivation, under a series of well—specifiedassumptions,
of rules which the tax system must follow if it is to maximize(alternative
representation of) social welfare. Not surprisingly, these rules provide
formulae for optimal rates of tax on different commoditiesor different
levels of income which are functions of severalkey parameters in economics:
price (and Income) elasticities of demand, thewage elasticity of labor sup-
ply, and the interest elasticity of saving,among others.
*ThIs paper was presented at the InternationalEconomic Association
Conference on "Contributions of Econometrics to Public Policy," Urbino,
Italy, September 1976.I wish to thank Partha DasGupta and the other
conference participants for useful suggestions.
**Stanford University andNBER.2
It is thus obvious that estimates of these parameters play a crucial
role in both the analysis and potential implementation of optimal tax
theory. First, such estimates are necessary inputs in the provision of
numerical examples of the optimal tax formulae. The range of estimates
actually employed in analytical studies of optimal taxation is quite wide.
Second, the incorporation of optimal tax theory into actual tax policy de-
pends upon rather precise and stable estimates of these parameters. While
we may write interesting papers detailing the optimal tax rates for several
alternative plausible parameter values, the fiscal authorities, of course,
must develop and implement a unique set of rates. While the rates can,
do, and should change occasionally, we would hardly endear ourselves to
either taxpayers or tax collectors if we proposed changing the rate with
each new empirical study appearing, say, in Econometrica!
Fortunately, a renewed interest in obtaining Improved econometric esti-
mates of these parameters has occurred simultaneously with the renewed theo—
retical Interest in optimal tax rules. The availability of new data, the
development of new estimation methods and a renewed interest in the prac-
tical policy implications of the theoretical propositions of optimal tax
theory have produced new and substantially improved econometric estimates
of some of the most important determinants of optimal tax rates. Combined
with some of the more robust propositions of optimal tax theory, this new
and improved econometric evidence has important implications for tax policy.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a progress report on the issue
of the implications of optimal tax theory and recent econometric evidence
for tax policy. Toward this end, Section 2 provides a brief and often3
heuristic suary of the major results of optimal tax theory. I discuss
the famous Ramsey Rule and inverse elasticity formula for optimal commodity
taxation. I also discuss the application of this analysis to the question
of the desirability of a consumption rather than an income tax. Finally,
I present the implications of the analysis of optimal direct taxation.
These analyses highlight the importance of labor supply and saving elasti-
cities.
Section 3 reports the results of some recent econometric studies of
saving and labor supply. Particular attention is paid to relating the
econometric evidence to the theoretical constructs of the optimal tax
models. For example, I discuss in detail the problem in going from esti-
mates of the relation between hours of work and net wage rates to the con-
cept appropriate for the optimal tax problem: the wage elasticity of labor
supply in the envelope sense, subsuming effort and human investment. I
also discuss recent attempts to analyze tax disincentives to saving. In
reporting a brief suary of recent econometric evidence, I must, of
course, exercise my (subjective) evaluation of sometimes conflicting studies.
I shall also take the liberty of relying upon my comparative advantage and
draw heavily upon my own work.
Finally, Section 4 outlines the implications of the combined theory
and econometric evidence for tax policy. My conclusion is that on the one
hand considerable progress has been made on several basic issues; these
include the choice between consumption and income as the basis for direct
taxation; the desirability of eliminating the practice of income splitting
and using different rate schedules for primary and secondary earners in4
the family; and the desirability of avoiding extremely high, marginal tax
rates on highly productive groups making up a significant fraction of the
labor force.
On the other hand, much work remains to be done before optimal tax
theory can serve as anything more than a very rough general guide to tax
policy. First, additional theoretical work to examine the robustness of
the results to alternative specifications is desirable. Second, consider-
ably more econometric evidence is necessary before we have enough confidence
in the precision and stability of the estimates of the relevant parameters
to progress beyond several broad generalization to a more precise specifi-
cation of the tax structure.5
2. The Theory of Optimal Taxation
The debate over desirable properties of taxes no doubt commenced
when the first (probably implicit) taxes were levied; inany event, it
continues unabated to this day. We are all familiar with Adam Smith's
four canons of taxation and their modern counterparts, suchas horizon-
tal equity, ability to pay, equal sacrifice, etc. The morerigorous and
precise analysis of taxation starts with Dupuit [1854] and Edgeworth [1897],
includes important contributions by Ramsey [1927], Pigou [1947],Hotelling [1937]
Boiteux [1956] and Harberger [1964] and is currentlyreemerging in the work of a
whole generation of public financiers. The utlitarian approach to which
I refer has been applied to a wide variety of problems, both in an out
of public finance. Its unifying theme is the study of how to achieve
certain goals (raising revenues, for instance) via public policies (e.g.,
taxes) in such a way as to maximize, or at least improve, src±al welfare
(which in turn depends upon the welfare of individuals) subject to a model
of the economy (e.g., the behavior of consumers).
This approach to public finance problems has been applied to such
diverse issues as the desirability of housing subsidies (Atkinson and
Stiglitz [1976]), public utility pricing (Mohring [1973]), congestion
tolls (Marchand [1971]), optimal indirect taxation (Diamond and Mirrlees[1971]),
and tax expenditures (Feldstein [1975]). A series ofrecent papers attempt
to relax some of the more restrictive assumptions of the theory,although
generallyat the expense of considerably complicating the optimal tax rules.
Useful surveys of the area may be found in Sandmo [1976] and Atkinsonand
Stiglitz [1972]; an interesting history of the development of this line of
thought may be found in Baumol and Bradford [1970].6
My purpose here is to present a brief heuristic introduction to the
area and to discuss the applications of the theory to three basic concerns
of tax policy: the choice between income and consumption as a tax base,
the tax treatment of the family, and the desirability of highly progres-
sive income tax rate schedules.
Let us start by imagining the simplest possible economy: consumers
have Identical preferences and endowments so distributional consideration
may be ignored, and we may proceed as if we have one consumer. The con-
sumer's preferences are represented by a utility function of the usual
sort,
U =U(Xi,...X) (1)
where Xi,...,X are the n goods produced and consumed in this economy.
For convenience, we take Xi to be leisure. Taking leisure as numéraire,
thegovernment seeks to collect a given amount, say T, in taxes. Hence,
i2 t1X1 =T (2)
where t the tax rate on commodity i. We shall further assume that
producer prices are fixed (the assumption of constant returns to scale is
all that is necessary). Thus is the difference between consumer prices
p and producer prices q1.
The problem for the fiscal authorities is to maxImize (1) subject to
(2). The first order conditions are7
auax ax
1E1--:j + 1
+X,) = 0 (3)
k =2,...,n
Substituting from the individual's first—order conditions for utility
maximization (U =
XP1for all 1) and from the budget constraint, we
have
Using the Slutsky equation and the symmetry of pure substitution effects,
we have
i2 tiski)= + i2 k =2,...,n
where I is exogenous income)
This equation yields the famous Ramsey rule: the proportionate reduc-
tion in compensated demand should be equal for all commodities (the right—
hand side is independent of k)!
As Sandmo [1976] and others have noted, this result is a particularly
vivid contrast to the common, but incorrect, supposition that an equi—pro—
portionate change in all prices (e.g., uniform commodity taxation) is
desirable.
fuller derivation may be found in Sandmo [1976] or Atkinson and Stiglitz
[1972].8
A heuristic, but more direct, derivation of the equal proportionate
reduction in demand rule which I have found useful in teaching undergrad-
uates (and which I owe to Eytan Sheshinski) starts with the usual partial




It is clear that efficiency requires that the (I suppress marginal) dead-







In general, of course, the structure of optimal taxes depends upon
the entire set of own and cross price elasticities of demand. In a model
in which we allowed for many goods (including goods at. different times and
locations), the informational requirements for implementing such formulae
are prohibitive (see Hahn [1973]). Fortunately, in practice tax rates
are generally levied by commodity groups. Such aggregation sharply dimin-
ishes the econometric information required (i.e., we are allowed certain
separability restrictions). Further, for several interesting problems,9
we can reduce our search to information on a very small number of key para-
meters.
Consider, for example, the issue of the desirability of uniform taxa-
tion of commodities. When is uniform taxation by a uniform VAT (or consump-
tion tax) preferable to differential excise taxation? First, if labor is
in completely inelastic supply (perfectly inelastic demand for leisure),2
it is optimal to tax only labor. In a world where only efficiency matters,
there is no deadweight loss caused by a tax on a commodity in perfectly in-
elastic demand. The same change in relative prices (between leisure and all
other commodities; the relative prices of consumer goods remaining unchanged)
may be obtained with uniform commodity taxation.3
Hence, in this special case, the optimal structure of taxes on all
commodities is found in the estimation of just a labor supply function (which
proved to be perfectly inelastic).
More generally, the optimal tax rates are related to demand elastici-
ties. Indeed, when cross—elasticities are negligible,4 the set of equations
(5) reduces to
(8) Pi C
2Theissue is whether the untaxed commodity (or commodities) are in complete-
ly inelastic demand. Since leisure —orrather time spent outside the
market, including work in the home —isin practice by far the rnotimpor— tantsuch commodity, we focus on labor supply in the discussion.
3The same result obtains whenutility is separable between leisure and other
goods and preferences for consumer goods are hornothetic.
4This proposition is sometimesclaimed to demonstrate that when all cross—
elasticities are zero, commodities should be taxed in inverse proportion
to their demand elasticities. Of course, if all cross elasticities are
zero, all own elasticities must be unity and uniform taxation is optimal.10
where Cisthe own price elasticity of demand. Thus, when we can safely
ignore cross—elasticities, commodities should be taxed inversely to their
demand elasticities.5 Other things constant, it is inefficient to tax
heavily goods with large demand elasticities.
The foregoing may be applied to the choice between income and consump-
tion taxation. While many other features of both each of the taxes and the
economy affect such a decision, a major concern is the relative elasticities
of labor supply and saving. If labor is In completely inelastic supply, It
is optimal to tax labor income only (as noted above). Thus, a purecon-
sumption tax Is optimal in this case.6 If consumption is unaffected by
Income (or interest income) taxation, it is optimal to tax only capital in-
come (If sufficient revenue can be raised). If both labor and capital are
in perfectly inelastic supply, any combination of labor and capital income
taxes is optimal.
In the more realistic case of some elasticity of both factor supplies,
the optimal tax structure is a mix of taxes on capital and labor income,
with a higher tax rate on the factor with the lower supply elasticity.7
Hence, once again, the implications of optimal tax theory for this impor-
tant Issue of tax policy depends upon (econometric) estimates of labor sup-
ply and consumption functions!
5Sincemany commodities with low estimated demand elasticities are consumed
disproportionately by the poor, this rule illustrates the efficiency—
equity tradeoff. Sandmo [1976] discusses approaches to this problem in
more detail.
6Actually, all that is required for a tax only on labor income to be optimal
Is that utility be separable between leisure (at each point In time)
and consumption.
7Peldstein [1977] presents a thorough analysis of this problem.11
As a special case of the analysis discussed above, consider the
problem of how to tax families in which there are two potential earners
(e.g., a husband and wife). The family's utility depends upon the con-
sumption of goods and the leisure of each potential worker:
U=U(C,L,L.). (9)
Thegovernment seeks to raise a given revenue and can tax the earnings of
the husband and the wife. Under what conditions should it tax them at the
same rate (e.g., as occurs under the income splitting provision, or joint
return schedule, available in many countries)? Indeed, should the govern-
ment attempt to tax the leisure of one of the earners via a wage subsidy,
while taxing the labor supply (via an earnings or payroll tax) of the other?
I have elsewhere (Boskin [1973]) analyzed this problem in detail.
The point here is that the solution depends upon the own and cross
substitution effects on the labor supply of husbands and wives.
Thus, once again, the optimal tax framework reveals that the answer
to a central issue of tax policy depends heavily upon estimates of own and
cross wage elasticities of labor supply (of husbands and wives).
While the tradeoff between efficiency and equity can be explored in the
optimal indirect tax context (see Atkinson and Stiglitz [1976]), we shall
not do so here. We turn instead to the analysis of optimal direct taxation.
Since it is feasible via direct taxation to levy taxes on individuals or
families at different rates, such taxes are a major potential Instrument
of redistribution policy.12
The earliest rigorous analysis of optimal direct taxation was
that of Edgeworth. He argued that if all individuals have identical declin-
ing marginal utility of income functions, the maximization of the sum of
utilities (his measure of social welfare) required equalization of income!
Of course, this analysis ignores the potential disincentives to supply
labor and save created by extremely high tax rates. Incredibly, the optimal
tax problem was not analyzed with the utilitarian approach incorporating
disincentive effects until quite recently. Starting with a remarkable
paper by Nirrlees [19711, a series of papers has analyzed the income tax
rate structure which maximizes social welfare subject to a government revenue
requirement, a skill distribution, individual preferences for income and
leisure (more generally producing Income versus not producing income, e.g.,
supplying labor, saving, educational investment, etc.), and production pos-
sibilities. Mirrlees' surprising result is that for a utilitarian social
welfare function (the sum of utilities), a Pareto or log normal skill distri—
bution, and elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure of unity
(i.e., a very elastic labor supply), the optimal tax rates are quite low
and actually decline over some income ranges; rather little redistribution
is optimal under Mirrlees' specification.
A variety of authors have extended Mlrrlees' analysis to consider al-
ternative social welfare functions, the endogeneity of wage rates, and al-
ternative skill distributions and labor supply elasticities. In general,
the optimal marginal tax rates, on different income classes, depend upon
the social welfare function, ability or productivity, the density of the
group in the population, and the elasticity of laborsupply.8 Stern [1976]
8See Stern [1976] for a survey of some of the more Important papers.13
has demonstrated the crucial role of labor supply elasticities. The larger
is the elasticity of labor supply, the lower the optimal tax rate. Further,
since the models are generally atemporal, they may be reinterpreted as
applying to an entire lifetime. Hence, the sensitivity of saving and human
investment to taxes also are important. The larger are the tax disincentives
to produce income in the market (via hours of work effort, human investment
and saving), the lower are the optimal tax rates; and if these elasticities
vary in the population, ceteris paribus, the rates should be higher in those
income groups with the lower elasticities.
The generic optimal income tax problem may be analyzed as follows
(I owe some of these points to Partha Das Gupta): individuals differ in
"ability" which we index by 8; g(O) is the probability density of 0, I.e.,
Ig(0)dO =1.Utility depends upon consumption of goods and leisure:
U =U(C8,) (10)
where C0 and are consumption and labor supply (negative leisure) of
someone with ability 0. Income depends upon ability and labor supply:
Y =y(O,Lo)with y >0 (11)
y >0.
The government cannot observe ability 8, and hence cannot tax it; It
only observes Income, a compound of ability and labor supply. Thus, it
imposes a (for expository purposes only) linear negative income tax with
creditand marginal tax rate 8. Hence,14
=
BJY(O.L0)g(O)dO. (12)
Hence, the budget constraint for an individual with ability level e is
Ce y0, £) + —By(O,Le). (13)







In choosing a and B, the government seekstomaximize social welfare
subject to (12) and the behavior of individuals defined by (14). We may
represent this social welfare function as
JG(U0(C, 2)g(O)dO.
(15)
Characteristics of the solution include the implication that the more
elastic is the supply of labor, the lower are a and 8, i.e., the larger
is the wage elasticity of labor supply, the less progression is socially
desirable.
Since the analysis of optimal indirect taxation revealed that the
smaller the wage elasticity of labor supply, the less desirable is capital
income taxation, an interesting paradox occurs: a conflict is created,
via the wage elasticity of labor supply, between increasing progression15
and the taxation of capital income! If the wage elasticity of labor supply
is small, substantial progression can be justified, but in a consumption
tax, not an Income tax! If the wage elasticity of labor supply Is large,
taxes on Interest income are desirable, and hence income taxation tends to
be preferable to consumption taxation, but the amount of progression which
Is socially desirable Is severely limited!
Our story Is by now familiar: the rigorous analysis in the optimal
tax theory framework of another important Issue of tax policy focuses
attention on econometric studies of labor supply and saving. To these
we now turn.16
3. Empirical Evidence
Now that we have established that (estimates of) labor supply(leisure
demand) and consumption (saving) elasticities are central concernsin ap-
plying optimal tax theory to tax policy, we mustexamine what is known
empirically about theseparameters.9
I shall argue that we have made considerable progress in recent years
in understanding both labor supply and consumption behavior.While we have
not yet precisely pinned down the relevant elasticities so asto permit
exact calculations of optimal tax formulae, I do believe someextremely
important general tendencies have been welldocumented and they do have
certain useful policy implications.
The notion that private saving is unaffected by taxes hasreceived
widespread acceptance among empirical and policy—orientedmacroeconOmists
in the United States (see, e.g., Okun (19751). This inferenceis virtually
always based on evidence which is flimsy at bestand dangerously mislead-
ing at worst —therelative constancy of the gross private saving rate in
years of relatively full employmentin the United States. While neither
the numerator nor the demoninator of this ratio measure theeconomically
correct concepts very well, a strong behavioral significanceis attached to
this reduced form relation. The best attempt torationalize this relation-
ship (usually termed "Denison's Law") —whichto my knowledge has never been
observed for any other economy —isthat of David and Scadding (1974].
shall confine myself to estimates for the United States, bothbecause
they are much more voluminous and I am much morefamiliar with studies
based on U.S. data than their counterparts based on non—U.S. data.17
In a thought provoking reexamination of "Denison's Law," they docu-
ment the continued constancy of the gross private saving rate, the con-
stancy of the saving rate augmented to include consumer durables purchases
in saving and the rental flow from durables in income, and changes in the
composition of private saving between the household and business sectors.
They interpret this relative constancy of the gross private saving rate
as evidence that taxes —eitherthrough a reduction in private income or
a reduction In the real net rate of return on capital —donot affect
private saving behavior. While this argument also has been made by a large
number of other economists, we shall demonstrate below that drawing such
behavioral inferences from these data is not warranted. The argument they
use to rationalize "Denison's Law" is that taxes and present consumption
are essentially perfect substitutes; the rise in taxes is offset by an
equivalent decline in current consumption. They go on to explore a variety
of intriguing conjectures concerning consumer behavior.
Three basic points need to be made concerning this conjecture. First,
most theories of consumer behavior relate saving to disposable income. If
this is correct, the saving rate varies substantially.
Second, it indeed would be surprising if consumers made this type of
rational calculation vis a vis the government and business sectors in terms
of gross saving and income. Consumers' capital depreciates. Again, our
economic theories generally relate to how consumers choose their net posi-
tion. Further, except for some possible embodied technical change, it18
is net saving that is relevant to the issue of whether taxes affect capital
accumulation. The net private saving rate —netsaving divided by net in-
come —exhibitssubstantially more relative variation than the gross series
and can hardly be called constant, even if we confine ourselves to the
postwar period.'0 While depreciation series are notoriously unreliable,
use of several alternative series based on tax, replacement cost, etc. de-
preciation still yields substantial variation in the net private saving rate.
I take this to be a strong indictment of the structural interpretation of
ttDenisont s
Third, even If total gross income and gross saving are examined, there
still may be an independent effect of real net rates of return on saving.
Even If taxes and present consumption are perfect substitutes (the public
sector is doing Its benefit—cost analyses properly, free rider issues are
ignored, etc.), the share of private wealth consumed today (publically or
privately) will depend upon the net, or after—tax return to saving, whereas
gross income is the flow from private wealth at the gross return. Hence,
taxes decreasing the net return to saving may cause a decrease in saving.
Before proceeding to a variety of estimates of saving equations, it is
perhaps worthwhile to offer a brief conjecture on the apparent constancy of
the saving rate. Consider two motives f or saving: smoothing of consumption
over the life—cycle and bequests. Further, assume bequests (broadly con-
strued to include provision of education as well as pure financial bequests)
are luxuries. Hence real income growth would tend to increase saving.
If we took the broader view of saving as inclusive of human investment,
use of Kendrick's [19761 data reveals still more variability in the
total saving rate, gross as well as net.19
However, if saving is also positively related to the real net return on
capital, the slight decline in this rate would lead to a decrease in saving.
Hence, the two effects offset one another. No doubt many other effects
have been at work as well. Thus, I find it extremely difficult to give
any structural or behavioral Interpretation to the constancy of the gross
private saving rate.
Merely pointing out some difficulties in interpretation of some data
does not suffice to reject the conjecture outright; nor does it provide an
alternative behavioral interpretation. Hence, we turn now to estimates of
the effect of taxes on private saving, i.e., to estimates of consumption.
functions.
Until quite recently, empirical studies of the effects of (tax—induced)
variations in the real after—tax rate of return on private saving were few
and far between. Break [1974] notes "Unfortunately, empirical evidence on
the interest elasticity of the saving rate is rare." Most such studies
conclude that interest rates have only a negligible effect on consumption or
saving. Musgrave and Musgrave [1974] report that "Studies of the relation-
ship between saving and the rate of return differ in their conclusion. Some
hold that there is a substantial negative relationship, while others attri-
bute little weight to the rate of interest in the consumption function."
Feldstejn [1970] has demonstrated that studies which use the nominal
(and/or before—tax) rate of return when the real (net) rate is appropriate
almost certainly bias the estimated elasticity downwards by a substantial
amount. While economic theory points to the real net of taxrateof return
as the price determining the consumption—saving decision (with, perhaps an20
0
independenteffect of inflation), I know of only two studies which attempt
to examine the sensitivity of consumption or saving to real net rates of
return and, hence, to the interest rate effects of income taxation.
Wright [1969] includes a measure of the return on stocks and bonds in
estimating consumption functions from U.S. annual time series data. His
estimates imply an Interest elasticity of 0.2. This is substantially larger
than the zero elasticity of "Denison's Law"! However, Wright's measure of
consumption and income suffer from several deficiencies, his data refer to
the period through 1958 only, and he estimates his equations in a manner
which does not allow for the endogeneity of the rate of return.
I have reexamined U.S. aggregate time series data in Boskin [1977].
Using improved data on consumption, income and wealth, I have estimated
consumption functions for several alternative sub—periods, definitions
of the key variables, functional forms, and estimation methods. My pre-
ferred estimate is as follows:
LGCONSP =—5.83+ 0.55 LGDPI + 0.32 LGDPI(—l) + 0.72 LGWLTH(—l)




R2 =0.99;SSR =0.0087;SE =0.021
where LG refers to natural logarithms, (—1) to a one—period lag, R
to the estimated real net rate of return, ittothe expected rate of in-
flation, UNEM to the unemployment rate, WLTH to the market value of21
assets, DPI to disposable private income and CONSP to consumption.
This equation is estimated by an instrumental variables procedure
which uses as instruments principal components of the variables usually
deemed exogeneous in large macroeconometric models (see Amemiya [19661
and Jorgenson and Brundy [1973]). It performs quite well by conventional
measures. The estimated standard error is a minute fraction of the mean
value of the left—hand variable. The estimated real net rate of return
elasticity of private saving is slightly larger than 0.4.
My other specifications yield estimated real net interest elasticities
of 0.2 to 0.6 (see Boskin [1977]). While such elasticities are hardly
enormous, they are much larger than those suggested by advocates of extremely
high taxes on capital income. We shall return to some extremely important
policy implications in our next section. For the moment, it suffices to
note that saving apparently is modestly sensitive to the taxation of capital
income.
What about labor supply? There is also a conventional wisdom that
taxes do not affect incentives to work (again, see Okun [19751). A more
detailed examination of this issue suggests that the effect of taxes on
total labor supply —includinghours of work, work effort and human invest-
ment —isquite difficult to estimate; we have a fairly useful set of esti-
mates of the effects of taxes on hours of work. This effect appears to
differ dramatically among alternative population subgroups. Unfortunately,
we know little about the effects of taxes on effort or human investment.
The renewed interest in estimating labor supply functions in the U.S.
occurs not only because of the availability of better data and improved22
estimation techniques, but because of the hotly debated issue of the
desirability of a universal income guarantee or negative income tax. Ob-
viously, the attention of both the politicians and the researcher has been
on the effects of negative income taxation on the work effort of the poor,
the recipients of the negative taxes. The theory of optimal taxation, of
course, reveals that the potential disincentive effects of the high tax
rates on the non—poor (used to finance the transfer) are at least equally
important.
The concept of labor supply relevant in our context is labor supply
in the envelope sense.Thus, effective labor supply reflects decisions
on hours of work, human investment and effort, as well as the individual's
ability. For expository convenience, suppose we can write the labor supply
as the product of these variables:
LS =HE•AI
where H is hours, E is effort, A is ability, and I is cumulative
net human investment.
The optimal income tax models postulate a probability distribution of
A in the population, which is given independent of taxes. H, E and I,
however, are potentially affected by income taxation.
Little is known empirically about the effects of taxes on E, work
efforts The effects of taxes on I, human investment, are rather complex
(see Boskin [19761). There frequently has been an assumption of strong
tax disincentives to human investment. For example, Schultz [1961] argues
Since non—pecuniary benefits on the job, including less effort, presumably
are a normal good, the (negative) income effect of the tax probably
increases effort.23
that "Our tax laws everywhere discriminate against human capital." Certainly
this has never been documented empirically. Nor do adherents to this view
identify the real culprit in the situation. Is it the taxation of the
returns to human investment at a positive rate? Is it the progressive
rate structure of the personal income tax? Is it the failure to allow
educational expense deducations? Is it the income effect of the tax com-
bined with differential public and private marginal propensities to invest
in human capital?
While the effects of the personal income tax on human capital invest-
ment depends upon all of these details, we begin by focusing on what we
believe to be the single most important feature of the relation between
human capital investment and the tax system, namely that the bulk of such
investments are financed out of foregone earnings which are not taxed. The
failure to appreciate this basic feature of human investment is, we believe,
a source of much of the confusion on the effects of taxes on human invest—
12
ment.
For example, take on—the—job training financed by tax—free foregone
earnings. In the absence of an income tax, the worker would engage in on—
the—job training up to the point where the incremental investment cost just
matched the present value of expected future returns. The imposition of a
flat rate tax t on the income from the investment reduces the net return
by (1 —t);the instantaneous write—off (since the investment cost is
tax free) reduces the tax liability by (1 —t)(at the margin). The
12Becker [19641 and Goode [1962] do point this out; of course, it is after
individuals have reacted to the tax that the bulk of finance consists
of foregone earnings.24
present value of the depreciation deduction equals the cost of the invest-
ment and if the training was a profitable investment with no tax, it is
still profitable in the presence of the tax—free foregone earnings.
The major human capital investment cost which is not tax exempt is
the direct cost of education, i.e., tuition, books and related expenses.
It is these expenses which have received the most attention in the public
finance literature. The argument has been that such expenditures are a
valid cost of earning income and should be deductible either when made or
depreciated throughout the workinglife.'3 While true economic deprecia-
tion of educational expenses would be nondistortionary (since under true
economic depreciation the differential equation describing the value of
human capital is independent of the tax rate, the value of the investment
14
would not be affected by the tax)it is not the only way to achieve
neutrality. Indeed, any tax which between its interest deductibility and
depreciation allowances yields a deduction whose present value equals the
investment cost is neutral. While I would be the last to argue that
capital markets work perfectly, particularly in financing human investment,
a modest fraction of higher education expenses are financed by borrowing
and at least the interest on this debt is deductible against future income.
In analyzing when tax depreciation of educational expenses would be
neutral it is important to note that many students investing in education
have little other income and hence would not benefit from immediate
'3See Goode [19621 for a discussion of these issues. Frequently ignored is
the lack of taxation on the human capital gain during education; this
tax is postponed until the Income stream is realized.
14See Stiglitz [1975]. Indeed, this discussion closely follows his dis-
cussion of tax depreciation of physical capital.25
write—off of out—of—pocket educational expenses. 15Unless they
were allowed to carry such a write—off forward for a considerableperiod,
the present value of the depreciation allowance will fall short ofthe
present value of the tax liability on the return to the investment and
hence will discourage investment in education.
The progressive rate structure of the personal income taxacts in an
analogous manner and not just on educational investments. Any humancap-
ital investment which increases future earningsenough to drive the tax-
payer into a higher tax bracket (after accounting for income averaging
provisions) may decrease the ratio of the present value of the deprecia-
tion allowance to the present value of the incremental taxliability.
Investments which are profitable at the current tax ratemay not be so
when account is taken of the increased future tax rate.
In addition to the distortion in the amount of the investmentin
human capital, the tax system also alters thecomposition of human invest-
ment. For example, the instantaneous depreciation of foregoneearnings
(relative to slower economic depreciation) favorslonger—lived human invest-
ments, e.g., general, rather than job specific, on—the—job training.
In summary, the current progressive rate structure of thepersonal
Income tax probably creates a disincentive to accumulate humancapital;
this disincentive is perhaps most severe forsecondary workers in two—
earner families whose incremental incomes from human investmentmay gen-
erate a large increase in marginal tax rates. The lack ofan educational
15Given theexemptions and deductions in the income tax.26
expenditure depreciation allowance probably biases investments awayfrom
education to job training. While the extent of these distortions is not
yet known, the fact that the bulk of such investment isfinanced by tax—
free foregone earnings casts doubt on the assertion that such disincentives
are large.
What about tax disincentives to hours of work? A large number of
empirical studies have been completed recently (see, e.g., the studiesin
Cain and Watts [1974], Heckinan [19741, Rosen [19761, and Hurd [19761).
These studies report labor supply elasticities which differ somewhat, but
as a whole they reveal the following: the hours of work of the largest
group in the labor force —husbands—isnot very elastic. Hurd's [1976]
estimates (which in many ways are the best, accounting for numerous
econometric problems) are the largest: an average elasticity of one—half;
the other studies estimate less elastic hours of work for husbands.
However, the hours of work of secondary workers —particularlywives and
elderly persons (see Boskin [1977]), are quite sensitive to (tax—induced)
variations in the net wage. The estimated wage elasticity of labor supply
for. wives usually exceeds unity.
What then, shall we conclude about labor supply? While much more
work needs to be done before we can pin down the elasticities for different
groups precisely, we can conclude the following:
1) Taxes affect the hours of work of wives and elderly persons
substantially (as the wage elasticity of hours of work for
these groups is large);
•2) Taxes do not appear to affect the hours of work of husbands
(although we should be careful about extrapolating to extremely
high rates) nearly as much as they do wives and elderly persons;27
3) Taxes maydistortboth the composition and the amount of human
investment; however, the effect on total humaninvestmentis
mitigated substantially by the tax—free nature of foregone
earnings, the major source of finance for human investment.
4) Virtually nothing is known about the effects of taxes on the
level of effort.
With these empirical studies of labor supply and saving in mind,
we turn now to a discussion of their implications f or tax policy.28
4. Implications for Tax Policy
The theory of optimal taxation, combined with econometric evidence
on labor supply and saving, has important implications for a variety of
issues in tax policy. We shall discuss their Implications for three
features of the U.S. tax system: the income—splitting provision for two—
earner families, the rate structure of the Income tax, and the choice be-
tween income and consumption as the tax base. We start by dealing with
piecemeal policy changes and then note their Interrelation.
The theory of optimal taxation Implies that, ceteris paribus, income
tax rates should be higher on those population groups with the lowest
labor supply elasticities. Thus, income tax rates should be higher on
the primary earner in the family (usually the husband) than on the secon-
dary earner(s).
Thus, the income—splitting provision, which allows spouses to pool
their income and to be taxed as if each earned one—half of the total, is
inefficient. In making the marginal tax rate paid on the first dollar
of earnings of the secondary worker equal to that paid on the last dollar
of earnings of the first workers this provision can reduce substantially
the after—tax wage received by the secondary worker. It is not uncommon
in middle—class families in the United States for the marginal tax rate
on the first dollar earned by the secondary worker in the family to reach
forty percent or more; and to this must be added transportation and other
costs. Combined with the non—negligible wage elasticity of the labor
supply of wives (who frequently are the secondary earner in the family),
this implies a huge labor supply disincentive.Sometimes this29
takes the form of withdrawal (permanently or periodically) from the
labor force.
I have estimated (see Boskin [1974]) the welfare cost of the tax—
Inducedreallocation of the capital stock and labor force between the mar-
ket and the home to exceed $20 billion, an astounding waste of resources.'6
While the econometric evidence is not in sufficient agreement to permit
an exact calculation of the optimal tax rates for primary and secondary
earners, the estimates are similar enough and sufficiently robust to con-
clude that the tax rates on secondary earners ought to be substantially
less than those on primary earners. Clearly, abolition of the income—
splitting provision would be a major improvement; we may eventually have
precise enough estimates to propose a new set of rate schedules in which
the rates differ not only by individual income, but also by whether the
Individual is the primary or secondary earner in the family.
The optimal income tax literature warns us of the danger of extremely
high marginal tax rates on population groups with some elasticity to their
labor supply. While the evidence for the bulk of the labor force —husbands
—suggestsonly a small elasticity of hours of work, to this must be added
any disincentives to human investment and work effort. As noted above,
empirical information on these issues is rather desperately needed. My
own opinion is that there is enough of an elasticity to argue against
extremely high rates of tax but not so high as that frequently assumed in
producing the very low rates reported in the optimal Income tax literature.
includes the effect of other taxes and the reallocation of capital
as well as labor.30
Since the disincentives depend heavily upon the marginal tax rates, a
strong argument can be made for broadening the base of the tax and lowering
the rates.'7 While I do not agree that there is no justification for many
of the provisions in our various taxes which reduce their bases substantial-
ly (e.g., taxable income in the U.S. individual income tax is perhaps one—
thirdof income correctly measured), one way to reduce the tax rates is to
broaden the taxbase.'8A second, of course, is todecrease the revenue
raisedby the government. The optimal income taxliteraturesuggests that
ratherlittle public income redistribution is desirable, a striking contrast
to the trends in virtually all advanced economies. This issue is deserving
of a deeper analysis than I can provide here; I merely mention that I have
elsewhere (Boskin and Sheshinski [1976]) suggested a possible explanation
for this disparity (a relative income effect).
What does the evidence suggest as to the choice between income and
consumption as the appropriate base of tax? I hope I have convinced you
that saving is by no means in completely inelastic supply. Hence, a tax
only on capital income is ruled Out by the basic results of optimal tax
theory. I also believe that between the hours of work of secondary earners
and the hours, effort, and human investment of primary workers that there is enough
elasticity of aggregate labor supply to rule out a labor income tax as the
only form of taxation, i.e., a consumption tax alone is not optimal. How-
ever, in the U.S. (as in most other countries) capital income is taxed at
much higher rates than is labor income accruing to the same individual.
17Such as advocated by Pechman [1973].
18lndeed, the flow of income into tax—free activities occurs largely
because of the high marginal tax rates.31
The separate corporate income and property taxes, the ceiling on tax rates
on earned income and certain other provisions make the marginal tax rate on
(a large share of) income from capital much higher than that on labor income.
This has reduced saving in the U.S. by a large amount; in turn, the reduction
in capital accumulation has decreased income and welfare and raised the return
on capital relative to that on labor. Again, I have analyzed this in detail
elsewhere (Boskin f 1977]). My conclusion is that the rates of tax on capital
income should be lowered relative to those on labor income; optimal tax
theory and the econometric evidence point strongly in this direction. Such
policies as integrating the corporate and personal income tax and/or reforming
the taxation of individuals in the direction of a consumption tax are desirable.
Many authors have concluded that a very progressive personal income
tax is desirable. The analysis and empirical results suggest that
extensive progression and income taxation do not go together: the larger
the wage elasticity of labor supply, cet. par, the less progression Is
desirable and the more desirable is the taxation of interest income; the
lower this elasticity, the more progression is desirable and the more
desirable is the exemption of interest income from taxation.
The three policies discussed above have an important interrelation. If
we abolished income—splitting in favor of a separate, lower rate schedule
for secondary earners, part of the labor supply disincentive which inhibits
high marginal rates on labor Income could be overcome. A more comprehensive
tax base could also allow a reduction in rates which could more easily be
combined with the higher rates of tax on labor income implicit In a
consumption tax. The combination of the three policies —movingtoward
a comprehensive personal tax which largely exempted the income from32
capital and embodied a separate schedule of (lower) rates for secondary
earners —wouldsubstantially improve welfare and allow a more equitable
distribution of the command over resources. The potential gains from
reducing these severe taxdistortionsin our economy are enormous. While
Ibelieve we have more work to do before we can recommend precisely
optimal policies, on many important issues, including the three discussed
above, the theory and evidence are sufficiently clear in their implica-
tions to provide an important impetus to tax reform today.33
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